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The purpose of this study is twofold. On one hand, the objective is to assess the 
impact of new and more complex contracting schemes, as opposed to traditional 
marketing channels, on small farmers’ welfare. On the other hand, the study explores 
which may be the critical factors that determine the small farmers’ participation in these 
institutional arrangements. In this context, two critical factors are stressed. The first one 
has to do with access to credit and the second one is the size of the agricultural plot.  
In order to examine the decision of farmers to access the dynamic markets, the 
paper follows the study of Lapar et al (2003). The paper also follows impact evaluation 
techniques to identify the differences in the performance of farmers with access to 
dynamic markets and those without access.  As it can be seen, in all cases, the difference 
between farmers with access and those without access is positive. This implies that 
having access to dynamic markets has positive impacts on the welfare of farmers. The 
results show that the farmers linked to the dynamic markets gain two cents of a dollar 
more per kilogram of potato.   
  Although, in average potato producers in the Sierra need about 7,500 US$ 
additional credit to access dynamic markets, the variance between producers is huge. 
Some farmers, for example, are extremely close to gaining access the market and just a 
small increase on the credit line would allow them to achieve that. On the other hand, an 
important group of small farmers —more than half of them — are much further away 
from accessing the market; about 25,000 soles (US$ 7,500). In this case the amount 
needed to access the market is almost three times higher than the average sales of a v 
farmer selling to the traditional market. Moreover, 10% of the formers in the sample need 
over 15,150 US$ to ensure access to the market, which is the maximum credit line 
registered in the sample of farmers with access to dynamic markets. On the other hand 
the lack of scale of the producers is another major bottleneck. Our simulations showed 
that increase of their plot size to a minimum of five hectares (optimal size according to 
the industry) increases their sales to dynamic markets in 16%.  
However, the impact of new and more complex contracting schemes, as opposed 
to traditional marketing channels, could reduce significantly the access gap to dynamic 
markets by reducing transaction costs, increasing productivity, and increasing scale 
production through coordination of smallholders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
Supply chain management is a recent significant institutional change affecting 
smallholder agriculture in the domestic markets of developing countries. Martin 
Christopher (1998) defines supply chain management as “the management of upstream 
and downstream relationships with suppliers and customers to deliver superior customer 
value at less cost to the supply chain as a whole.” In addition, transaction cost economics 
provides a theoretical framework for understanding the governance structure of the 
supply chain. Many authors point out that there is a continuum of vertical coordination, 
with the spot market on one end and the vertical integration on the other. Between the 
two extremes are hybrid forms, which can be divided into specification contracts, 
relation-based alliances, and equity-based alliances with different coordination 
characteristics relating to interdependence, information sharing, and duration of 
relationship (Peterson et al., 2001).  
 Relationships in supply chains ranges from an “arm's length” relationship — 
based on vertical restriction — to vertical integration. According to Phil R. Kaufman 
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(1999), however, there are four major goals that retailers pursue through the use of supply 
chain management. These goals have to do with ensuring lower costs for: (1) operations, 
(2) procurement, (3) marketing, and (4) distribution. 
Supply chain management is beneficial to poor farmers as it provides them with 
information on new products, input, credit and extension services, marketing services, 
and it brings them closer to consumers. In turn, this can ease the resource constraints and 
reduce the production and marketing risks that farmers usually face. Changes in 
procurement systems toward integrated supply chains may have important implications 
for the rural producers’ bargaining power and the level of product quality demanded from 
them.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Its first objective is to assess the impact of 
new and more complex contracting schemes, as opposed to traditional marketing 
channels, on small farmers’ welfare. Second, the paper seeks to identify critical factors 
that determine small farmers’ integration in the new institutional arrangements. In this 
context, two critical factors are stressed: (1) access to credit and (2) the size of the 
agricultural plot.   
The paper analyzes a stratified sample of over 300 small potato farmers (with less 
than five hectares of land) in the Mantaro Valley in the central highlands (Sierra region) 
of Peru. Around 100 of these farmers have adopted key farming and/or marketing 
innovations that allow them to access two dynamic markets
4: (a) producing high quality 
                                                 
4 For the purpose of this study, “dynamic market” refers to those markets able to absorb increasing levels of 
farm output due to their size or rapidly increasing demand. 3 
seeds, and (b) producing high quality potatoes for the potato chips industry. The rest of 
the sample covers relatively similar producers, with similar ecological setting and land 
holding, which have chosen to sell their potatoes through traditional marketing channels. 
These producers can be used as a potential control group to evaluate the overall impact 
and determinants of accessing dynamic markets.  
Thus, in line with its objectives, this study analyzes the determinants of dynamic 
market access of small commercial farmers in Peru; it also assesses factors critical to 
enhancing market linkages that can increase productivity and income growth for this type 
of producers. The paper is divided into seven sections, including this introduction. 
Section 2 provides an overview of potato production in Peru, whereas section 3 focuses 
on potato production in the Mantaro Valley and the role played by NGOs (non-
governmental organizations) providing technical assistance for potato production there. 
Section 4 explores in detail the relationship between small farmers and the potato 
processing agro industry, specifically the role of the FOVIDA — an NGO linking small 
farmers with the potato processing industry. Section 5 provides a thorough description of 
the database used in this study. The following section deals with the methodological 
framework employed to determine the likelihood of dynamic market access of those 
producers who use traditional marketing channels. In addition, this section provides 
major empirical findings. Finally, last section offers concluding remarks and policy 
implications 4 
2.  THE SMALL COMMERCIAL POTATO PRODUCTION IN PERU 
Potato is a very important product in the Peruvian food system.  It is harvested in 
almost every region of the country, although its production is concentrated in the Andes, 
given the lower temperatures that favor the growth of the crop there. The production of 
potato is intended mainly for domestic consumption. 
In the last three years, potato production levels have been rising continuously 
thanks to yield improvements (Figure 1). While in 1990 the national average yield 
reached 7.800 tons per hectare, it came close to 14.000 tons in 2003. 
  Figure 1—Annual production of potatoes, 1990-2002 
 




  Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Peru. 
 
 
According to the Agriculture Census (CENAGRO), there were around 800.000 
potato producers in the entire country in 1994, where nearly 60% of them worked on 
agricultural plots smaller than 5 hectares. The most important zones of production are 
located in the central Andes, in the Mantaro Valley; it extends through the regions of 
















Junin and Huanuco, which together with the Andean Plateau in the south-eastern part of 
Peru — mainly in the region of Puno — represent the regions with the highest levels of 
potato production. Also, some valleys on the south coast, like the valley of Cañete and 
the valley of Ica, in the regions of Lima and Ica respectively, have become important 
production areas lately, mainly because they were able to attain very high yields thanks to 
better soil conditions. The intensive entrepreneurial production is concentrated in the 
central region and on the coastal valleys as they are the major suppliers to Lima, the 
largest market of in Peru (covering around 30% of the population of the country). On the 
other hand, the potato production in the Andean Plateau is mostly for self-consumption, 
and marginal local trade.  
   Figure 2 shows the average participation of the principal potato producer regions 
over the last twelve years. Junin, Huánuco and Puno together constitute more than 35% 
of the total production, while the rest of the departments are below 10%.  












                          Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Peru. 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Peru.  





















Nevertheless, although the regions of Lima and Ica contribute only 5.8% and 
2.5%, respectively, to the national production, the yields in those regions are double the 
national average, and even three times the national average in the case of Ica only.  
Figure 4, shows the monthly evolution of the real farm prices during the last 
years. Contrary to what happened with production yields the prices show a clear 
decreasing tendency on the last years. 
  Figure 3—Potato: Average yield by region, 1990-2002 
 












Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Peru. 
 
    Figure 4—National average on farm prices 
 




Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Peru.






























3. POTATO  MARKETING  IN THE MANTARO VALLEY 
 The sample for this paper includes potato producers along the Mantaro Valley. 
As one of the main potato producing regions in Peru, Mantaro Valley is characterized by 
an unequal development of goods, capital, and services markets. Within the valley the 
production methods are predominantly traditional, but the areas along the valley plains 
have specialized production systems with strong links to the market. 
This section compares small potato farmers who have received technical 
assistance and are integrated into dynamic markets, and those that have not made the 
transition to dynamic markets yet. There are two different ways in which potato 
producers in the Mantaro Valley establish links with dynamic markets: (a) through the 
production and sales of certified potato seeds, and (b) through the production and sales of 
potatoes belonging to an industrial quality intended for the chips industry.  
The objective of this section is to compare producers linked to the dynamic 
markets, either through the production and sales of certified potato seeds or through the 
production and sales of industrial quality chips, with other (similar) producers that did not 
have access to these marketing alternatives. For the purpose of making this contrast 
clearer, producers that did not demand technical assistance (essential in establishing links 
to new markets) were treated as a potential control group. 
The study identifies two companies that have provided the necessary technical 
assistance to producers for developing links with dynamic markets: (a) FOVIDA 
(Promotion to life or “Fomento a la vida”), (b) ECOSER (Commercialization and 8 
Agricultural Services Company or Empresa de Comercialización y Servicios 
Agropecuarios). These technical assistance companies have been working on the 
provinces of Chupaca, Concepcion, Huancayo and Jauja in the Region of Junin and their 
activities were conducted under the framework of the INCAGRO
5 program. 
FOVIDA is an NGO that has been working in the Mantaro Valley since 1997; it 
has commercial links with Snacks America Latina, Peru SRL (Frito Lay) since 1998, and 
has been one of its major suppliers since then. FOVIDA has worked toward establishing 
alliances with small potato farmers in the valley and helping them develop economic 
opportunities. These alliances are established between the small potato farmers in the 
Mantaro Valley as FOVIDA’s clients, FOVIDA as a service provider and high quality 
seeds supplier; and indirectly, with Snacks America Latina Peru SRL, as a commercial 
partner, an agreement that guarantees the selling of potatoes for the “capiro” crop that 
complies with the quality standards of the company. 
According to FOVIDA (2002), an assistance service proposal is sustained on the 
development of three axes: the transference of organizational capacities, techno-agro 
ecologic capacities and, finally, management and commercial capacities. The extension 
services offered are:  
1.  Organizational strengthening to improve the negotiation capacity of small 
farmers, so they can gain access to dynamic markets; incorporate an 
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competitiveness, and co-financing. The project administers resources provided by the World Bank and the 
Public Treasury, and supervises contributions from sub-project implementing entities. 9 
entrepreneurial logic in farmers’ collective decision making processes, guide them 
not only on how to reach markets and prices for their products, but also explain 
alternative ways in which they can increase their competitiveness, for example, 
through cost reduction as a result of advantages from collective input acquisition. 
2.  Technical assistance on production to achieve requested production levels by 
focusing on the relevant aspects of production. This includes seeds renovation, 
fertilizing plans, crop control, and prioritizing integrated techniques of plague 
control. As a consequence of the latter, farmers aim at achieving a production that 
represents physical and chemical standards required for the transformation 
industry (shape, size, sanitary requirements, contents of sugar reducers, and dry 
matter). 
3.  Post harvest assistance, which incorporates selection, classification, and 
packaging of the production according to the market demands. 
4.  Assistance on management and commercialization, incorporating economic and 
accounting management instruments that will support individual and collective 
management of the farmers. 
ECOSER, on the other hand, is located in Jauja. Its main objective as an NGO is 
to improve the profitability of potato farming in the Jauja province through the use of 
high quality seeds. According to ECOSER Jauja (2001), the assistance services provided 
are as follows: 
1.  Strengthening the potato seed production system based on an efficient process of 
obtaining in vitro “seedlings” from the tissue labs, pre basic seeds from the 10 
company greenhouse, and, finally, getting seeds from conducting fields through 
alliances or contracts with farmers for different categories of quality seeds 
according to the specific demands. 
2.  Extension and capacity building events and the use of quality seeds. The objective 
is to improve farmers’ technology giving priority to commercial varieties and 
being responsive to the demand. These technologies include quality control, 
certification, and optimal management of the crop; they are complemented with 
post-harvest and in-store management techniques. 
3.  Technical assistance and capacity building of the producers of seeds. There is a 
special emphasis on the matter of prevention of plagues and diseases, through an 
integrated management strategy. 
4.  Organizing producers, especially those producing seeds (handling production 
costs). 
4.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SMALL FARMERS AND THE 
POTATO PROCESSING AGRO INDUSTRY 
In 1998, the processing firm, Snacks America Latina Peru SRL reduced the 
number of contracted farmers from 30 to 7. Nevertheless, this was done at a high storage 
cost for the firm, because to ensure a year-round supply of potatoes in Peru, the industry 
needs to combine the potatoes coming from the southern Costa (from December to 
March), the Sierra (from end of March to July), and the central Costa region (from 
August to November). However, consolidated land holdings at a scale needed for the 
industry are only secured in the Costa region. Thus, a reduced number of contracted 11 
potato growers would imply a need for purchasing larger quantities of potatoes and 
storing them throughout the period when there is not available harvest in the Costa 
region.  
This condition created a “window of opportunity” for an intermediary that could 
bear the monitoring cost associated with coordinating small potato farmers in the Sierra 
region. If the monitoring costs were lower than the storage costs, such a contracting 
scheme would have been possible. This is how FOVIDA, which had been working with 
potato farmers in both the Costa and Sierra regions, seized the opportunity of filling this 
gap.  
FOVIDA set out on building its reputation as a reliable partner of Snacks America 
Latina Peru SRL, first in the central Costa — an area characterized with a greater 
production scale, better infrastructure, and lower transportation and transaction costs. 
Thus, in 1998, Snacks America Latina Peru SRL employed two methods of purchasing 
potatoes: (i) directly from farmers with a plot size of five or more hectares; or, (ii) from 
smaller farmers organized under the umbrella of FOVIDA.  
It is important to note that, firms do not sign contracts with farms that are new 
potential direct contracting partners; instead they maintain an informal agreement, closely 
monitoring their activity and verifying that they can perform according to firms’ 
standards. Only after one year, the firms sign a contract — usually for 5 hectares — and, 
if turns to be successful, they expand it to cover all the hectares owned by the farm. This 
process is costly for firms, which is why they are often reluctant to engage in it. The 
monitoring system that FOVIDA provides is considered a good alternative. In fact, 12 
currently almost 50% of the potato supply for Frito Lay is provided by FOVIDA. In 
addition, another “implicit” service that FOVIDA offers for the firms is identifying and 
“screening” farmers that can potentially become direct farm contractors for the potato 
processing agro industry.  
  The contract that firms establish with individual farmers is essentially the same as 
the one they establish with FOVIDA on behalf of small producers. It is signed two or 
three months prior to the sowing season and establishes a fixed price that is always 
substantially above the price of potatoes supplied through traditional channels. However, 
the contract establishes specific objectives in terms of increasing yields production costs, 
proper management of the crop and so forth. The industry has very strict quality 
standards that farmers must meet. For example, the dry content of the potato should be in 
the 22% to 24% range to be accepted. Sugar content should be in the 0.02% to 0.03% 
range for proper frying.  FOVIDA does this monitoring work for firms. For example, it 
uses a frying kit to evaluate the quality of potatoes through sampling before it is 
harvested. This process assures the timeliness of the harvest.  
Although corporate policies prevent firms from giving loans to farmers, the 
industry does give advance payments to farmers in the form of seed.  Nevertheless, this is 
restricted to the most qualified farmers. On one hand, this may be due to special abilities 
required to use effectively the seed produced by Frito Lay. On the other hand, the seed 
quantity produced by the firm is insufficient to cover the demand of all of its contracted 
farmers. 13 
Frito Lay has organized a number of contests, and awards monthly and annual 
prizes that reward quality standards and productivity. These awards have served as a 
signaling system and have encouraged small farmers to adopt farming practices of those 
who win the contests. 
The successful role of FOVIDA as an intermediary between the firm and the 
small producers is evident in a number of activities performed by the NGO, which can be 
summarized into three main areas: a) usage of information networks; b) building trust; 
and c) building capacity for collective action (Johnson et al. 2002). 
Information networks 
FOVIDA has been able to use its network of potato producers in the Costa region 
(that was built prior to its work in the Sierra region) to identify seed suppliers of the 
variety Capiro for Sierra. In addition, it has taken advantage of its knowledge of the input 
and output markets to benefit small farms through the reduction of key transactions costs. 
In addition, FOVIDA has provided technical and financial advice to farmers and, though 
it cannot provide credit to farmers, it has used its influence and expertise to ensure access 
to credit for several farm groups. 
Building trust 
FOVIDA has been able to build social capital in the form of trust. This has 
occurred, first, by reducing Frito Lay’s cost of monitoring contract compliance and by 
managing emergencies that occur along the cropping season. A quick response to the 14 
latter affects positively the quality of potatoes that reach the processing plant. The ability 
of the firm to verify that quality always meets the required standard has allowed for trust 
to emerge and consolidate. In turn, this increasing trust has affected the marketing 
behavior of the firm by increasing the share of the market that is supplied by FOVIDA 
and strengthening the bonds between the firm and the intermediary. 
Building capacity for collective action 
FOVIDA has organized small farmers to take advantage of their collective action 
and has obtained economies of scale in the input and output markets. In particular, 
collective commercialization, collective provision of inputs, collective financing, and 
collective purchase of complementary services like technical assistance are key elements 
that render tangible benefits in terms of lower input costs and higher output margins, 
when negotiating with the industry.   
Unresolved market failures 
Although FOVIDA has been able to provide an effective solution to a number of 
market failures, there still is a key problem that remains unresolved — poorly developed 
seed market in this sector. The type of seed used is a common pool good which does not 
generate proper incentives to develop this market. The varieties used to produce potato 
chips (Capiro and, to a lesser extent, Tomaza or Canchan) are “open-pollinated varieties”, 
which can potentially be reproduced and disseminated through formal or informal seed 
distribution channels. Interviews in this study reveal that production coming from a good 15 
Capiro seed may be used for four or five cropping seasons without degenerating. Under 
these circumstances it is unlikely that the private sector will be interested in developing, 
multiplying, and selling certified seed coming from these varieties.  This may change 
eventually if there is a seller that establishes reputation for quality and reliability for the 
supply of such varieties and can either charge a premium or take advantage of lower unit 
costs thanks to securing a significant market share.  
Currently, in the Mantaro Valley area there are few, if any, good and reliable 
potato seed producers. There is, in fact, a high willingness to pay for good seed. 
However, many seed producers sell common seeds as if it were basic (certified) seed. As 
there is no public seed supervision system, farmers cannot tell the difference between 
these types of seed until it is too late. Because of insufficient quantities of good quality 
seed in the potato chips market, the agro industry (Frito Lay) has been compelled to 
produce certified seeds of the varieties they prefer. This seriously affects Frito Lay’s 
interests, which is incurring additional costs because potato seed imports are prohibited 
(supposedly because of sanitary reasons). Consequently, even when, for example, a 
corporation has three biotechnology laboratories (located in Chile, México, and 
Australia) that are part of its network, they need to produce their own genetic material to 
multiply and sell pre basic and basic seeds to “seed growers” who will, in turn, produce 
“certified” seeds. 16 
5. THE  DATABASE 
The data on the producers receiving technical assistance was obtained with the 
help of ECOSER and FOVIDA, as they both worked on the frame of a public program 
for technical assistance which co-finances around 50% of the provision of services. In 
addition, the list of farmers provided by these two NGOs was modified to exclude from 
the sample those producers that had received assistance for less than a year. This was 
done to ensure that those farmers that were sampled as “connected to dynamic markets” 
had enough time to incorporate into their activities what they learned from the technical 
assistance programs. Map 1 and 2 show the exact distribution of our sample of producers 
under receiving technical assistance from FOVIDA and ECOSER. 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, the study focuses on a sample of about 300 
potato producers located in the region of Junin, in the central Andes of Peru. The sample 
is quite heterogeneous, encompassing a wide range of production scales and market 
insertion mechanisms so as to generate an in-depth assessment of the restrictions as well 
as potentialities that dynamic markets exhibit in the context of small farm producers. 
The sample design is such that it consists of small producers that have accessed 
some market niche (considered as dynamic markets) through technical assistance, 
compared to other producers that have not requested technical assistance, but continued 
to use traditional markets to sell their output. 
For the purpose of this study, “dynamic market” refers to those markets able to 
absorb increasing levels of farm output due to their size or rapidly increasing demand. 17 
For the crop under analysis (i.e. potato), there are two market niches that can be 
considered as dynamic: a) the market for processed potato (chips) and b) the seed market. 
    Table 1—Number of cases with different institutional arrangements 
 
Institutional arrangements 
Product  With access to dynamic 




Potato 83  206 
     Source: Authors’ findings. 
 
 
Given the sample design, all producers that have access to dynamic markets are 
also recipients of technical assistance. Thus, by excluding producers who have not 
received any technical assistance from the sample, the analysis cannot distinguish 
between the pure effects of the technical assistance from the impact that the technical 
assistance generates by allowing farmers’ access to new market opportunities. This being 
the case, the results of this research must be read as the joint impact of both processes. 
The differences between farmers with access to dynamic markets through 
specialized technical assistance, and those without access to any technical assistance and 
still relying on traditional consumption market evidence that ECOSER and FOVIDA 
have accomplished to enroll in their program a group of farmers that could be called 
“elite”. 
As Table 2 shows, the potato producers with access to dynamic markets have a 
higher educational level (an average of almost two or more years of formal schooling for 
the head of the family), better life conditions (associated to the characteristics of 
dwelling), and more household assets (almost three times more productive assets, and 18 
almost two times the size of the land property) than farmers relying on traditional 
markets. Additionally, farmers with access to dynamic markets participate in more 
organizational activities. They also have the perception that access and levels of credit 
they could have are significantly higher than those available to farmers with no access to 
such markets.  Finally, the results also show that these farmers are willing to take bigger 
risks. 
These differences are also evident when comparing certain strategies of market 
insertion and agronomic practices. For example, the use of quality seeds is clearly higher 
among farmers with access to dynamic markets; it is also evident that, in contrast with 
traditional farmers, they dedicate an exclusive part of their land to commercial 
production. 
When considering the agronomical practices, there are differences in the use of 
living walls and the use of rotation; all of which need to be analyzed in depth to find out 
if they are associated to the practices advised, directly or indirectly, by ECOSER and 
FOVIDA. 
The first evidence of the impact of dynamic market access comes from the 
significant differences between the potato production rates and prices of farmers with 
access to dynamic markets, as a result of the technical assistance, compared to those that 
do not have access to dynamic markets. It must be noted that there are yield differences 
(production per hectare), but they are not significant. This shows that the intervention 
allows the improvement of the market linkages (through products with different 
characteristics) that goes beyond an improvement of the yields levels.  19 
Table 2—Characteristics of the potato producers 
 




Number of Household Members  4.5  4.9 
Sex of Head of Household  0.93  0.94 
Age of Head of Household  48.3  48.6 
Years of Education of Head of Household  11.7  9.9*** 
Maximum Years of Education within the Household  13.5  12.1*** 
Dwelling has a Quality Roof (yes=1)  0.19  0.09** 
Appropriate Access to  Water on dwelling (yes=1)  0.9  0.70*** 
Dwelling has a Qualiity floor (yes=1)  0.64  0.39*** 
Dwelling has a Quality walls (yes=1)  0.31  0.17*** 
Appropriate Access to toilet services on dwelling (yes=1)  0.34  0.25* 
Appropriate Access to power supply on dwelling (yes=1)  0.96  0.94 
Household Assets Value  3,100  2,105** 
Productive Assets Value  14,117  5,179*** 
Land Holding (Has.)  5.7  2.3*** 
Risk Attitude - (1=more averse, 5=less averse)  3  2.5** 
Maximum Credit access  20,859  7,476*** 
Number of Organization Memberships  2.2  1.2*** 
Note:***99% significance, ** 95% significance, * 90% significance.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 20 
Map 1—Sample of producers connected and not connected to dynamic markets 
from the list of FOVIDA 
 21 
Map 2—Sample of producers connected and not connected to dynamic markets 




    Figure 5—Income distribution of potato producers 
 
(Income in natural logarithm) 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Finally the difference in prices is also reflected in the net income differences by 
hectare and the well-being, measured based on the per-capita family expenditure in 
Figure 5 and 6. Despite the important variability on the income of farmers with access to 
dynamic markets and the control group (those without access to dynamic markets), 
Figure 5 and 6 show clearly that the income distribution of farmers with access to 
dynamic markets is located to the right of the income distribution of those without access 
to technical assistance and who choose not to sell their potato for consumption. 23 
6.  ESTIMATION OF THE “DISTANCE” TO DYNAMIC MARKETS 
6.1.   CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
According to Lapar, Holloway, and Ehui (2003), a way of studying the decision 
of farmers on accessing or not dynamic markets, is the comparison between the utility 
that the farmers would receive if they had access to such markets (for example by   
gaining technological knowledge) — expressed as
*
i y = U (Z1) — and the utility that they 
would obtain if they did not have access to such markets — expressed as 
*
i v =U(Z0) — 
where Z represents the sales
6. Assuming that the difference between the utilities is 
determined by a set of specific characteristics of each producer, i x , the following 
relationship can be established: 
   ) (
*
i i i x f y =       ( 1 )  
Where it is assumed, without loosing generality, that the utility without access to 
dynamic markets is equal to 0, and therefore the difference of utilities is equal to yi. 
If Zsi, the sales value, of those who cannot sell in dynamic markets could be observed, 
this would be negative value (Zsi <0), and the distance to the axe would show how far a 
farmer is from the dynamic market. At the same time, that “distance to the market” (δi), 
on the context of this study, shows the distance to the dynamic market. 
                                                 
6 The asterisk (*) indicates that both utility levels are latent variables, not observable variables. 24 
  Figure 6—Income distribution of potato producers by program 
 






Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Due to the fact that the utility levels are not observable, it is necessary to define 
an observable indicator, y, which will take the value of 1 when the utility related to the 
access to dynamic markets is higher than the utility of not having that access, and 0 in the 
contrary case. 25 
That could result in the following: 
     1   i f   0
* > y      (2) 
 
y =  0            o.w 
 
In this context, a probit model approximation of access to dynamic markets would be: 
  
 ) ( ) 1 ( β i i X y prob Φ = =        (3) 
 
where the endogenous variable takes the value of 1 if the household has access to a 
dynamic market, and 0 otherwise. The Xi vector contains a set of variables that 
characterize the farmer, these include: demographic variables (number of household 
members and the age of the head of household), education (years of education for the 
head of household), value of goods possessed (value of households’ assets for 
production), measures of risk aversion (the rate of risk aversion is calculated through a 
set of games), access to credit (farmers perception of credit line), and social capital 
(number of organizations in which the household takes part). β  is a vector of 
coefficients, which controls the relationship between the household characteristics 
mentioned earlier and the dynamic markets participation; and finally  i u  is a random 
error.  26 
When it is assumed that  β i x  follows a normal distribution, the interpretation of 
the coefficients in the Probit model can be difficult, because they are interpreted as a 
change in standard deviations in  β i x  when there is one unit increase of an exogenous 
variable. To avoid this complexity, the following transformation is carried out: 
  1
1





    (4)   
where φ  and Φare the density function and the standard normal function, respectively, 
evaluated in ) ( β x ;  1 x  is the exogenous variable and  1 β  is its respective coefficient. After 
this transformation the coefficients show the change in the probability  ) / ( 1 x ∂ Φ ∂ when 
there is an infinitesimal change in an exogenous variable. 
Once the estimation of the probit model has been carried out, it is possible to 
obtain from the equation an estimation of the “distance to the market”. This distance is 
defined in terms of the required increase in any variable that characterizes farmers, for 
example
c x , in such a way that the farmers that do receive technical assistance can still 
have access to the market. For this particular case, in order to have a monetary measure, 
the “distance to the market” is quantified by estimating the additional credit level that 
each household not participating in the dynamic market will require to be able to take 
part in this market. 
This study simulates the increase on the credit level for all of the non-
participating farmers, so their probability of participating on the market exceeds 0.5. 
When starting from equation (3), the amount of credit necessary for these producers to 27 
increase substantially their probability of participation on the dynamic markets is 
identified: 














i x  is the amount of credit that the household i needs in order to participate in a 
dynamic market, 
c
i x  is the credit level observed on that household,  c β  is the parameter 
that represents the measure of the credit effect over the participation, and  I X β  is the 
product of the matrix of household characteristics multiplied by the coefficients without 
the credit level. 
6.1.1   Tobit estimation of the sales to dynamic markets 
Since the data is only observable for the potato sales that take place in dynamic 
markets, the only farmers considered here are those that participate in such markets.  The 
sales of farmers who use traditional markets are classified as 0 (censured data). That is 
why the estimation of a Tobit model is relevant, because it would provide an estimator of 
the latent variable for those with no access to dynamic markets. 
The amount of potatoes offered by all farmers who are represented in the dynamic 
markets sample can be described as: 
      ) (
*
i i i x f y =                                                 (6)   
Additionally, the sales on dynamic markets observed are: 28 
*
i y  if  0
* > y  
y =                                                    (7) 
0 if 0
* ≤ y   
This means that we are only observing the sales that take place in the dynamic markets, 
for the farmers that sell in those markets. 
The determination and interpretation of the parameters on the censored regression 
models of the Tobit type will depend on the objectives of this specific study.  This paper 
is trying to predict the volumes of potato sales in dynamic markets, due to a set of 
household characteristics. Therefore, the correct estimation of the marginal effects must 
be carried out from the conditional expected value of the censored variable. 







∂Ε ⎛⎞ =Φ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
                                                    (8) 
Once the estimators are obtained, it is possible to use the decomposition of the 
marginal effects proposed by McDonald and Mofitt (1990), to assess, under an 
exogenous shock, the relative importance of the presence of new producers with respect 
to the increase on the sales of the ones that were already selling on the dynamic markets. 
That decomposition is as follows: 
[ ] [] [ ] [] [ ] || , 0 P r 0
Pr 0 , 0
ii ii i i
ii i
ii i
yx yxy o b y
ob y y y
xx x
∂Ε ∂Ε > ∂ >
=> + Ε >
∂∂ ∂
                       (9) 
From this equation, a change in  i x  have two effects: the first one affects the 
conditional average of  
*
i y  on the positive part of the distribution; and the second one, 
affects the probability that the observed data falls on that part of the distribution. For this 
study equation (8) will show the change on sales in dynamic markets and the change on 29 
the probability of selling in that market under a change in an exogenous variable, for 
example the credit level of the farmers. 
6.2. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
6.2.1   Determinants of access to dynamic markets for the small potato farmers  
Table 3 shows the main characteristics of the farmers with access to dynamic 
markets for potatoes are related to the use of technical assistance. As it can be seen, the 
main variables that begin to explain participation are those associated to the degree of 
organization of the producers, their level of education, and their access to credit 
(represented by the credit line indicator).  
It is interesting to note that the education shows some discontinuity, i.e. the 
variable is significant (and negative) just for incomplete primary school, but after 
completing primary schooling it shows important positive returns.  
 
 30 
Table 3—Probit models for market participation in potato dynamic markets   
 
Variables   Marginal Effects 
   (St. Desv.) 
   Model 1   Model 2  
Number of Household Members  -0.028 * -0.026* 
   (0.015)   (0.015)  
Age of Head of Household  -0.004 ** -0.003  
   (0.002)   (0.002)  
Maximum Years of Education within the Household  0.021 * .  
   (0.011)   .  
Maximum Education Achieved is Incomplete Primary (0=no, 1=yes)  .   -0.224***
   .   (0.060)  
Risk Attitude - (1=more averse, 5=less averse)  0.023   0.025  
   (0.018)   (0.019)  
Credit Line (thousand of soles)  0.01 *** 0.011***
   (0.003)   (0.003)  
Land Holding (Has.)  0.005   0.005  
   (0.006)   (0.006)  
Number of Organization Memberships  0.114 *** 0.118***
   (0.024)   (0.024)  
NGO Dummy  (0=Ecoser, 1=Fovida)  -0.122 ** -0.124** 
   (0.060)   (0.061)  
             
Number of Observations   287   287  
Pseudo R-square  0.219   0.222  
           
   Participants    
% positive predctions   40.7%   34.6%  
% negative predictions   59.3%   65.4%  
              
   Non participants    
% positive predctions   5.8%   4.4%  
% negative predictions   94.2%   95.6%  
Note: Marginal Effects are calculated for dummies reflect the change when dummy changes from  0 to 1. 
***99% significance, ** 95% significance, * 90% significance. 
 
 
Table 4, shows the results of the estimation of necessary credit increase to turn 
non-participant farmers to participate in the dynamic markets as a result of the technical 
assistance services. To express the distance to the market on monetary units, the 
necessary amount of the credit line increase has been simulated for those that do not have 31 
access to dynamic markets. The relative magnitude of that “distance” is surprising; in 
average it represents less than 2% of the production value. 
Table 4—Transaction costs or distance to "dynamic markets”  
 
(units of credit)* 
Credit increase by…. 
Potato Producers 
Households by zone 
Average increase on 
the credit required 
to access the 
Technical Assistance 
Market (thousand of 
Soles) 
Hectares of potato 
(thousand of Soles)




Credit increase as 
% of the Potato 
Production Gross 
Value  
Total Sample  26.9  24.4  4.9  1.39% 
Ecoser Sample  25.4  19.1  4.5  1.44% 
Fovida Sample  28.1  28.3  5.1  1.35% 
Source: Agropecuary producers Survey GRADE 2003.  
             Authors’ calculations.   




Nevertheless, as Figure 7 shows, there is a strong variance among farmers. Some 
farmers are extremely close to the market, in the sense that only a small increase on the 
credit line would allow them to access dynamic markets. On the other hand, an important 
group of small farmers (more than half of them) are located further away from the 
market; a distance of 25,000 soles
7 (in this case the number is almost three times greater 
than the average sales from a farmer in the traditional market). Moreover, 10% of the 
sample is located at distances greater than 50,000 soles (i.e. 15,150 US$), which is the 
maximum credit line registered on the sample of farmers with access to the dynamic 
markets. 
                                                 
7 This is approximately 7,500 US$. 32 





Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
6.2.1 How robust are the results? 
A potential problem with the estimated “distance to market” is that it is difficult to 
know its statistical distribution and make sure that the average values reported above are 
a reasonable approximation to the expected value of the distance to the market. It is not 
possible to obtain directly the distribution of δ since it is the ratio of two random 
quantities (see equation 5). 
To see this more clearly recall that the participation equation in the dynamic 
market has the following from: 
 
PP P P
ii i yX u β =+    (11) 
                                                                      
where  yp
i  is not observable:  δi = 1 when yp
i > 0 
From this equation it is possible to deduce the probit model shown above: 33 
  (1 )( )
PP
ii prob X δβ == Φ    (12) 
Similarly, sales in the dynamic market can be expressed as: 
                                                           ys
i *= di ys
i**                                                      (13) 
where ys
i**  represents the potential censored sales due to high transaction costs. We can 
observe ys
i**  = MAX (λ, ys
i*) where ys
i* is the optimal latent value (not observed) of 
sales in the dynamic market and λ is the transaction costs that needs to be overcome to 
access the dynamic market. This last equation can be rewritten as: 
  *
SS S S
ii i yX u β =+    (14) 















≡− = −    (15) 
As noted earlier, δ measures what is needed for producer i, in terms of a particular 
observable (in this case credit), to participate and sell a certain quantity in the dynamic 




One indirect way of evaluating the distribution of δ is using the Monte Carlo 
simulation method. In this case following Holloway et al. (2002) the study uses a Gibbs 
sampler, which is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method. The idea behind this way of 34 
retrieving the posterior distribution of δ is the following: if the conditional distribution of 
the following equation is identified: 
|,, ~ [( ) ,( ) ]
PS P P y y Truncated Normal E y v y β Σ  
 |, , ~ [ () , () ]
SP S S y y Truncated Normal E y v y β Σ    (16) 
 )] ( ), ( [ ~ , , |
S S P S v E Normal y y β β β Σ  
  | , , ~ Wishart - Normal Inverse [ ( ), ( )]
SP yy E v β ΣΣ Σ  
It is possible to draw random samples of the posterior distribution of  ) , , , ( Σ β
S P y y F , 
which is the joint distribution of all parameters of interest (the latent variables that 
measure the distance to the market and the standard deviations of those estimates), these 
random samples can be obtained in a consistent way following the iterative procedure 
suggested by Holloway et al (2002). This procedure allows for obtaining simultaneously 
the parameters of the probit and tobit equation plus the estimate of the “distance to the 
market” and its confidence interval. 
Figure 8 shows the confidence interval obtained for the distance to dynamic 
potato markets
8. It is important to note that although the average values are similar to the 
ones reported above, the distribution of the parameter of interest (δ) is asymmetric and 
biased towards zero. This pattern may be a signal that farmers in the area under study 
may be more likely to enter the market than initially thought as a lower increase in any of 
                                                 
8 Participation and sales equations are very similar to the ones reported above and are not report here but 
are available upon request. 35 
the independent variables may be needed to motivate a demand for technical assistance 
that directs the producer into the dynamic market. 
Figure 8—Estimated distance to the potato dynamic market 
 










Lower  Bound (5%)
Distace to the Dynamic Market
Upper Bound (95%)
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
 
6.2.3  How profitable are dynamic markets? 
The next question to ask is how profitable it is to have access to dynamic markets. 
In order to estimate the hypothetical difference in different outcomes for farmers with 
access to dynamic markets compared with similar farmers, but without access to dynamic 36 
markets the study follows the Roy-Rubin model.
9 Let D be a binary assignment indicator, 
indicating whether an individual unit participated in dynamic markets, the treatment 
effect of each individual unit is then defined as the difference between its potential 
outcomes: 
    Δ  = Y
T - Y
C                           (10) 
where Y will be the change in the impact variable and the supra indices refer to the 
treatment group (T) and the control group (C). Since it is not possible to estimate 
individual gains with confidence without observing Y
T and Y
C for the same individual 
unit simultaneously, attention is paid to the population average gains from treatment 
(ATE), or the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT): 
   E [ Δ|D=1] = E(Y
T | D=1) – E(Y
C | D=1)             (11) 
Then, if the condition: 
    E ( Y
C| D=1) = E(Y
C | D=0)             (12) 
holds the non-participants can be treated as an adequate control group. If, in addition to 
the treatment and outcome, a background variable is observed (or vector of variables) Xi, 
and assuming that the treatment depends on the potential outcomes of only Xi, the 
unconfoundedness condition can be formally expressed as:   
\      E(Y
C | D=1, Xi =x) = E(Y
C | D=0, Xi =x)                    (13)  
In non-experimental data, as in this case, having access to dynamic markets, 
generally, would not be independent of potential outcomes since the decision to access 
                                                 
9 The original ideas can be found in Roy (1951) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1994). For further discussion 
of these approaches, see Hujer and Wellner (2000), and Lechner (2000). 37 
the dynamic market is likely to be correlated, for example, with the local lending 
environment or with unobserved characteristics of the property, such as the property’s 
value in the local financial market when looking at the channel of collateral and credit 
markets. However, given that the technical assistance of FOVIDA and ECOSER was 
assigned to the data in a quasi-experimental fashion — independent of household demand 
for access to better markets for potato or to better selling prices or credit — and because 
the outcomes of interest would be changes in expenditure, income, value potato sales, and 
the selling prices, unconfoundedness is likely to hold conditional on characteristics of the 
household observed. 
 This is how the assumption concerning heterogeneity and selection of 
observables in the sample is justified. In addition the study, uses a matching method to 
identify the appropriate control group to each farmer who currently has access to the 
dynamic market (i.e. a “very similar” farmer who does not participate in the dynamic 
market).  The similarity should correspond to the characteristics that are important to 
determine the access to the dynamic market described in Table 3.  
There are different techniques that may be used for the matching method, as well 
as forms that help interpret what is considered “most similar”. A matching method is, for 
example, one that relates each beneficiary to a control with the minimum Euclidean 
distance
10 between their characteristics. Another method is that of Mahalanobis, which 
corrects the Euclidean distance by using the variances and co variances among attributes. 
                                                 
10 Euclidean distance is the traditional approach to estimate the distance between a pair of points in any 
given space.  38 
In This paper the matching of a beneficiary will be done not with one particular control, 
but with a weighted average of controls, in which controls nearest to the beneficiary may 
have greater weight and those that are farthest, a smaller one. The non parametric Kernel 
method is used here: 
∑
=
= ∈ } 0 {






j i W      ( 1 4 )  
where KI,k =K((PI-Pk)/h) is a kernel weight that gives less weight to the farthest controls 
from PI,  and h is a parameter that defines the bandwith
11 (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and 
Todd, 1997).  
Table 5 presents the results for four output indicators: total value of potato sales, 
average potato price received by the farmer, total household expenditure, and household 
income. As it can be seen, in all cases, the difference between farmers with access and 
matched farmers without access is positive. This implies that having access to dynamic 
markets has positive impacts on the welfare of the farmers.  
Specifically, in the case of potato sales and average potato price, the result is 
significant at 5% confidence level. Farmers linked to the dynamic markets get two cents 
of a dollar more per kilogram of potato.  Although the differences in income and 
expenditure are not significant at 5%, the results are similar to those of Escobal (2004), 
who found that the net income is much higher (165 US$ per month) for those who were 
                                                 
11 The selection of h is of central importance for the use of the kernel method; in this respect the procedure 
proponed by Silverman (1986) is used.  39 
able to connect to the potato chips market than for the matched farmers (that is with 
similar endowments) who remained in the traditional potato market.  
 




6.2.4   Impacts of sales to dynamic markets 
Obviously, it is not only important to know how close a farmer is from selling the 
first unit of production in a new market, but also how much could the farmer sell in that 
market if some of the restrictions faced were relaxed. 
Table 7 shows different simulations based on the Tobit regression results of Table 
6, on changes on the credit line for farmers in the sample with access to dynamic markets 
as well as for those without it. The first simulation duplicates the average credit line 
available, but distributes it evenly among farmers (the same amount for each one). On the 
other hand, the second simulation duplicates the credit line of each individual farmer. 
Finally, the third one duplicates the credit line per hectare for each farmer. 
ATT ATE
Total Value of Potatoes Sales  10,826 6,432 2,409 28,571
Average Potato Price 0.069 0.064 0.019 0.109
Household Total Expenditure  3,477 3,016 -2,711 9,853
Household Total Income  6,699 2,992 -2,299 21,395
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: ATT is average treatment on the treated, ATE is average treatment effect using non parametric 
          Kernel method.  
All values are in Peruvian soles, to convert to US$ the exchange rate is 3.4 soles per US$.
Access to Dynamic Markets vs No Access
[ 95% Conf. Interval ]40 
Table 6—Tobit model for sales in potato dynamic markets in accordance to NGO's 
influence zone   
 
Variables  Marginal Effects 
   (Standard Dev.) 
   All    Ecoser    Fovida   
Number of Household Members  -2.291   -5.772   1.179  
   (4.470)   (8.252)   (2.354)  
Age of Household Head  -1.418**  -1.223   -0.74** 
   (0.701)   (1.285)   (0.371)  
Máximum Education Achieved is Incomplete 
Primary (0=no, 1=yes)  -71.908   -1.897   -247.696  
   (56.238)   (92.586)   (0.000)  
Risk Attitude - (1=more averse, 5=less averse)  0.067   0.413   0.306  
   (5.609)   (10.705)   (2.787)  
Credit Line (thousand of soles)  2.789***  4.92***  1.043*** 
   (0.598)   (1.146)   (0.304)  
Land Holding (Has.)  4.801***  5.671**  0.518  
   (1.549)   (2.377)   (1.158)  
Number of Organization Memberships  22.124***  28.147**  10.046*** 
   (6.750)   (13.869)   (3.227)  
NGO Dummy  (0=Ecoser, 1=Fovida)  -53.047***  .   .  
   (17.807)   .   .  
Constant  -48.793   -112.56   -26.648  
   (46.488)   (89.938)   (21.243)  
                 
Number of Observations   287   128   159  
Number of Censured Observations   207   89   118  
Pseudo R-square  0.0689   0.0781   0.0772  
               
   Participants    
% positive predictions   30.1%   41.5%   28.6%  
% negative predictions   69.9%   58.5%   71.4%  
               
   Non participants    
% positive predictions   2.9%   3.4%   2.6%  
% negative predictions   97.1%   96.6%   97.4%  
Note: Marginal Effects are calculated for dummies reflect the change when dummy changes from 0 to 1.  




Table 7—Decomposition of dynamic markets sales variation after simulations of 
positive credit shocks 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Decomposition 
     
By older sellers                       920  35.7%                  2,443  58.0%                  4,316  62.1%
By newer sellers                    1,654  64.3%                  1,772  42.0%                  2,637  37.9%
Total variation                    2,573  100.0%                  4,215  100.0%                  6,953  100.0%
Percentage increase 
over total sales  46.8% - 76.7% - 126.5% -
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Results of the first simulation suggest that the response is important, yielding a 
47% increase on the sales to dynamic markets. Furthermore, two thirds of this increase is 
concentrated on producers that had never been related to dynamic markets, and only a 
third of it is related to old farmers that already had access to dynamic markets. On the 
other hand, under the other two scenarios, as it was expected, there was a bigger impact 
on older farmers that already had access, had a greater amount of land and possessed 
other assets that made them more productive. In contrast, under these scenarios, farmers 
with no current access would have smaller possibilities to access dynamic markets.  
An alternative simulation is presented on Table 8. Here the simulation takes place 
on three different scenarios based on an increase in the scale of production of the small 
farmers: first, second, and third scenarios assign farmers additional land until they reach a 
minimum size plot of two, three, and five hectares, respectively. Those simulations can 
be interpreted as an accumulation of additional land or, alternatively, as a consolidation 
of different plots as a result of some association scheme. In these cases, the results, as it 










+ credit t credit + 2 * i credit42 
with no access to dynamic markets and who benefited from the simulated increase in 
their production scale. 
Table 8—Decomposition of dynamic markets sales variation after simulations of 
positive shocks in hectares possession 
Decomposition  Scenario 1:  
    min [2 own has.] 
Scenario 2:          
  min [3 own has.] 
Scenario 3:    
       min [5 own has.]      
By older sellers  44.7 24.8% 91.3 24.9% 224.7 25.9%
By newer sellers  135.5 75.2% 275.3 75.1% 643.6 74.1%
Total variation  180.2 100.0% 366.5 100.0% 868.3 100.0%
Percentage increase over 
total sales  3.3% - 6.7% - 15.8% -




7.   CONCLUSIONS 
Market failure in rural Peru is widespread due to many problems like poor 
infrastructure, market segmentation, poor enforcement of contracts, imperfect 
information, high risk, and regulatory uncertainty, among the most important. Therefore, 
it is unrealistic to expect that, under this scenario, agro industry by itself will be 
successful in connecting farmers to output markets. Consequently, non-competitive 
markets and inefficient private provision may justify Government and/or NGO 
intervention. However, such interventions need to be cautious to avoid exacerbating the 
existing problems and further slowing down or, even worse, impeding the development 
of efficient and competitive markets 
Evidently, the relationship between the small farmers and the two dynamic 
markets identified in this study has been mediated, in both cases, through NGOs. In cases 43 
where thin or underdeveloped markets prevail, NGOs may provide the “social capital” 
needed to successfully link small producers facing high marketing and transaction costs 
with processors that face high uncertainty and monitoring costs. NGOs may provide 
market access information using their networks of contacts. They may also reduce 
transaction costs related to contracts by building trust in both sides of the market 
spectrum. Further, NGOs may build capacity for collective action for small and disperse 
farmers. 
  As Johnson, Suarez, and Lundy (2002) argue, firms use their information 
networks to identify and contact clients, access market information and inputs, and obtain 
technical and financial assistance. In this case, it is clear that both NGOs, and particularly 
FOVIDA, are very successful in using their information network to help small potato 
farmers reach new dynamic market opportunities. As a result farmers linked to dynamic 
markets have higher sales are receive higher prices for their potatoes.  
  According to the agro industry
12, the main bottleneck for connecting directly a 
processing firm to potato producers is producers’ lack of scale. Most commercial 
producers have plot sizes smaller than five hectares. According to the industry, a 
minimum threshold of five hectare plot is required to absorb fixed costs of the potato 
production for the potato chips market. This fixed cost includes initial training costs, 
capacity to use (and destroy) a fixed batch of production for testing purposes, and paying 
for proper specialized soil analysis. The amount of fixed costs prevents many small 
farmers from entering to dynamic markets independently. This is also confirmed by the 
                                                 
12 This information is based on an interview with a key manager of Frito Lay, in September 2004. 44 
simulations of increases of the plot size for smallholders.  Increases in the scale 
production of small farmers until they reach a minimum size plot of five hectares results 
in a 16% increase of sales mainly explained by new sellers linked to the dynamic 
markets. 
In addition financing problems are very important for producers. Credit does not 
reach farmers in time; although this is a serious problem in general, it is especially critical 
when farmers are growing a variety like Capiro, which requires enough liquidity from 
sowing to harvest. For example, the loans for some farmers interviewed for this research 
were only disbursed after the harvest. Consequently, they were not able to test the sugar 
content of the potatoes (which cannot exceed 0.03%) and harvest them before reaching 
the required levels.  
  We showed in this paper that in average potato producers in the Sierra need about 
7,500 US$ additional credit to access dynamic markets, although the variance between 
producers is huge. Some farmers, for example, are extremely close to gaining access the 
market and just a small increase on the credit line would allow them to achieve that. On 
the other hand, an important group of small farmers —more than half of them — are 
much further away from accessing the market; about 25,000 soles (US$ 7,500). In this 
case the amount needed to access the market is almost three times higher than the average 
sales of a farmer selling to the traditional market.  Moreover the impacts are clear; results 
from the simulations implemented showed that by duplicating the average credit line 
available to the farmers and distributing it evenly among farmers, total sales to the 45 
dynamic markets will increase in 47%. Furthermore, two thirds of this increase will be 
concentrated on producers that had never been related to dynamic markets. 
In a nutshell, the results obtained in this study indicate that appropriate investment 
policies in infrastructure need to go together with well-functioning market institutions in 
order to take advantage of market opportunities, sustain increased agricultural output, and 
raise rural incomes. This is critical for smallholders who do not have access to market 
information and cannot gain access to dynamic markets independently; thus, even when 
the hard infrastructure exists, these farmers capture little of the value they create. The 
demand and supply remain highly unstable, and so are the distribution costs for goods 
produced in rural areas. Finally, markets often do not work for smallholders and that 
creates a need for intervention as recognized in this study. 46 
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